6. The political economy of military recruitment and education privatisation

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INTRODUCTION

A post-9/11 higher education landscape in the United States does not differ much in the attitudes and ultimate goals from its imperialist wartime predecessors. That being said, many of the overarching policies and accompanying budgets of the last two decades speak to an increasingly enmeshed relationship between the armed forces and both the public and private sectors of education in the US. Several researchers and authors concerned with neoliberal approaches to education and the decline of democratic instruction have written on the subject, including but not limited to Henry Giroux, David Segal, and Suzie Abajian. The following overview of the literature covers three fundamental aspects of the relationships between education, the armed forces, and a resulting safety net resembling many of the tropes utilised for beneficiaries of other social welfare programmes. Currently, people of colour, Black and Latino folks in particular, enlist in the armed forces at rates much higher than their presence in the civilian population (Segal & Verdugo, 1994). As of 2019, 19 percent of enlisted active duty members are Black Americans, but only nine percent are active duty officers, with the civilian population falling somewhere in between at 13.4 percent (DMDC Active Duty Military Personnel Master File, U.S. Census Bureau, 2019).

The transition from a conscription to an all-volunteer-force (AVF) in 1973 meant strategies to recruit and enlist service members would now rely on understanding the labour market, the degree to which the US military can raise or maintain benefits in comparison to private employers, and the quality of recruitment strategies themselves. Moreover, Black adolescents typically join the military to earn skills that are transferrable to the labour force, not unlike my father whose only work experience at the time was minimum wage food service. Black enlisted members who choose to stay in the armed forces do so often out of a belief that the military is less racially discriminatory than the civilian workforce (Segal & Verdugo, 1994). All of the aforementioned opportunities rely heavily on an individual's ability to perform well on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), a standardised test used to measure qualification for enlistment and general ability through mathematics and verbal questions. Like many other forms of standardised testing, evaluation of 'ability' often determines wages and other types of earnings. For the AFQT, scores can indicate incoming rank, which ultimately establishes the trajectory of someone's military career. In recent years, the poverty level of military families has increased while their

ability to subsidise educational, housing, and healthcare needs has decreased (Khalil, 2021; Toropin, 2021). A 2021 study by the Military Family Advisory Network surveying active duty soldiers, veterans, retirees, and military spouses indicated that one in five military families were food insecure. Separating out active duty members, respondents still reported that at least 15 percent of active military personnel experience food insecurity (Donnelly, 2021). Currently, the military's Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) is incorrectly calculated as income when members of the military attempt to apply for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) or food stamps (Burke & Rachidi, 2020). A beneficiary's location and subsequent cost of living help determine the distribution of stipends; high cost areas like San Diego, CA would provide a higher monthly benefit and those living on base never directly receive their housing funds. As a result, military members and their beneficiaries can struggle with poverty without the option to turn to other subsistence programmes; this was particularly true when many military spouses lost their jobs during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Activism in response to many of these recruitment efforts is often not successful, due in part to the large stream of funding provided by the military for research and development at many top-tier universities and high schools. Another issue is quite simply the lack of alternative resources to supplement income opportunities that provide housing, healthcare, travel, and the chance to experience promotions within the organisation. To be more exact, military benefits like housing are not restricted by increases in income or the presence of both parents in a household. Brian Gifford's 2006 piece, *The Camouflaged Safety Net: The U.S. Armed Forces as Welfare State Institution*, highlights the differences between social assistance programmes and the wide array of benefits promised to military families. Gifford writes, 'Whereas TANF requires that single mothers initiate palimony procedures against a child's father, and reduces their benefits equal to the amount of their court awarded payments, single mothers in the military are not required to demonstrate paternity and experience no reduction of benefits in cases where fathers pay child support,' (Gifford, 2006, p. 386).

More than 70 years after the passage of the initial GI Bill, the United States continues to use discretionary military funding as a means to maintain power and imperial expansion. In 2018, the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) provided $10.7 billion in funding for 700,000 beneficiaries of the post-9/11 GI Bill, which averages to $15,285.00 per pupil. Federal per pupil funding for post-secondary education averages to $2,032 whereas the spending from colleges and universities for each student is closer to $26,496 (Hanson, 2021). Moreover, the Department of Education reported that in 2012 about one fourth to one half of veteran students used grants and loans, like Stafford or Direct PLUS loans, that were not part of post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. For-profit institutions received almost 42 percent of post-GI Bill benefits during the 2013 and 2014 fiscal year and half of the tuition benefits from the Department of Defense. Among those, University of Phoenix and American Military University both share a high number of graduates and students who work with Top Secret security clearance despite their reputations as fraudulent diploma mills (Arkin & O'Brien,

2015; Baird et al., 2022). The University of Phoenix settled a law suit in 2021 for 50 million dollars over claims that it would guarantee jobs with corporations like Yahoo!, Microsoft, and Twitter (now X). Those who utilised private loans or GI Bill benefits are not included in the list of potential recipients of such refunds. Moreover, world-renowned research universities like John Hopkins University, Penn State, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) represent schools that receive some of the largest sums of money, an estimated billions of dollars each year to develop technology for security, surveillance, and other means of militarising the world.

K-12 INTERVENTIONS

Following the events of September 11, 2001 and the proliferation of gun violence across the United States, there was a shift in the implementation of programming in public schools, particularly schools located in urban areas, which now focused on instilling discipline, leadership, and the general values of being an upstanding citizen. Given the juxtaposition of the location and enrolment demographics of these militarised public schools in the context of the goals of these academies, it is apparent that there are deficit frameworks operating when conceptualising the needs of the communities these schools and programmes seek to serve. More specifically, programmes like Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) are present at more than 3,000 schools in the nation, with a disproportionate amount of these programmes being held in inner city areas, half of which are attended by students of colour and girls (Pema & Mehay, 2009). Creating military academies or subsidising public education with funding from the armed forces in urban schools with the agenda of promoting discipline and order does not tell a story of upward racial mobility or service to one's country if only a select few are chosen to undertake this task. I argue that the creation and enforcement of these ideals negatively impacts student opportunity in the long term given their exposure to hegemonic ideals of leadership and obedience without the very real implications of war, trauma, and death that are synonymous with service in the armed forces.

To better understand how these programmes operate within a larger political sphere, it is important to unpack the idea of necropolitics considering the role that the armed forces plays in utilising force and violence as means of accomplishing what has historically been a colonial and imperialist project. First introduced as a response to Michel Foucault's biopower, Achille Mbembe introduced necropolitics with this analysis: 'As an instrument of labor, the slave has a price. As a property, he or she has a value. His or her labor is needed and used. The slave is therefore kept alive but in a state of injury, in a phantom-like world of horrors and intense cruelty and profanity' (Mbembe, 2008). To explain further, sovereignty and the drive to maintain dominance determines who has the right to death, more specifically who has the means and the power to control death and to kill. As discussed in Mbembe's piece, these dynamics are deeply rooted in a racialised history of power dynamics which relates to Derrick Bell's concept of interest convergence. Derrick Bell, a legal scholar

and one of the founding contributors of Critical Race Theory (CRT), viewed the surge in civil rights legislation like the integration of schools as a means to prevent mass domestic unrest given the foreign conflicts brewing such as the Cold War, Korean War, etc., (Delgado & Stefancic, 2017). If Americans were to maintain our exceptionalism to the larger world, we could not send our citizens abroad to fight our wars only to return to segregated schools, subpar wages, and the Jim Crow policies that no longer fit with the 'American Dream' that all citizens were promised. Despite major pushback from other scholars, eventually many came to see Bell's claim as valid and conceded that foreign and domestic conflicts merging with civil rights legislation was our government's interests converging. Certainly, as the US continued in its struggle to be a world superpower, it simultaneously worked to control the means of death both domestically and abroad; Mbembe's slave/master metaphor expands just as globalism does. The administrators, school district board members, and other stakeholders who then participate in the project to militarise public schools subsequently subject students, in this case, Black, brown and Indigenous students and low-income students, to this psychic and often physical violence should they choose to enlist.

Alternatively, if not directly aiming for enlistment through popular culture, many recruiters fill roles that may be absent from the resource-poor schools that they often target. McDonough & Calderone (2006) speak to the economic impact of decision making for students and subsequent pressure military presence in schools creates for those students. They write:

> Implicit and explicit strategies, as articulated within the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (2004) Army School Recruiting Program Handbook, are designed to efficiently position on-site military recruiters as important sources of support for non–college-tracked, low-income students who are fundamentally unclear about their postgraduate options. (McDonough & Calderone, 2006)

Here we see the students are set up for a pathway to eventually become the next generation of GI Bill recipients; the aforementioned shifts in funding for future veterans no longer guarantee that the sacrifices they are sure to make will be a satisfactory return on investment for their college education. With the rising costs of tuition and higher education in general, it is likely that having Hummers and the implicit strategies are enough to bring these vulnerable populations to the table, but not enough to ensure they are well fed.

Furthermore, the rise of militarisation in urban schools through the passage of policies such as the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 has led to a subsequent increase in recruitment efforts in elementary and secondary urban schools. Aspects of the policy require that schools allow access to student information for the purposes of military recruitment, with the only option for parents to evade this policy being to individually 'opt out' of this information release. However, parents are routinely left out of the conversation regarding the dissemination of students' names, phone numbers, and addresses; therefore, they often miss the opportunity to waive inclusion into this data-

base. Failure to comply with this subsection of the legislation was met with political and financial consequences for the schools, particularly those financed through Title I funds (Abajian, 2018; Tannock, 2005). Also left out of the conversation regarding opting out of this information release is that the list of potential recruits is also tied to the list of potential scholarships and financial aid for college. Students who are already left out of the conversation regarding higher education are thus punished for choosing not to enter what is essentially a new-age draft in which brown and Black youth are posited as prime candidates for military service. To take a CRT perspective, a military uniform would ideally unify members and create a sense of shared identity amongst participants. This is one of the concepts purported by the armed forces; yet, students of colour remain the base of recruitment efforts while their educational trajectories are not highlighted as victories, but rather stories of a promising unified nation. Representing the United States in the political playground allows a colonial and neoliberal agenda to appear more diverse and non-threatening in comparison to those of the Spanish colonisers or Dutch settlers of yesteryear.

JROTC: HISTORY AND EVALUATION

Although the programme has been in operation for more than a century, the JROTC had its early beginnings in the creation of the National Defense Act of 1916 which provisioned government funding to provide resources and military trained instructors to lead programmes (Pema & Mehay, 2009). For parents and young students, part of the allure of JROTC enrolment is the mission to engage in citizenship as well as the 'adventure activities' that allow children to interact in ways that may seem similar to group activities like those popularised by Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts (Saltman, 2007). Within a spatial context of urban areas, offering sponsored group activity that allows young children to play outdoors is a welcomed commodity for low-income families. Unlike other programming that focuses on entering students into the work-force or extra-curricular activities such as after-school sports clubs or bands, there is no substantial evidence that JROTC promotes academic excellence (Bartlett & Lutz, 1998). Expanding further on the demographics of JROTC programme participants, the majority of parents who have children enroled typically have lower levels of completed education. Additionally, the students who complete JROTC have lower test scores, higher drop-out rates, and higher levels of enlistment in the military, some of which is indicative of a desire to enlist prior to engaging in JROTC as well as the high level of students with a parent enlisted in the military (Pema & Mehay, 2009). Looking simply at the demographics of the parents of JROTC participants, applying Mbembe's necropolitics has a historical and political indication – mainly that there is a cyclical nature to the lack of agency in these communities, most likely due to the historical projects carried out by previous recruitment projects, drafts, etc.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that although the JROTC enrols large numbers of students, there is also a large percentage of students not eligible for military service following their K-12 education (Pema & Mehay, 2009). Thus, many students are then

exposed to militarised educational settings, instruction, and policies without being able to take advantage of the advertised post-enrolment benefits like the GI Bill and other enlistment incentives that entice students of colour and low-income students. There are several implications for these students, mainly that there are no particular strengths of the programme in comparison to other programming offered in public schools. When considering this, the mission and structure of the programme seeks to reinforce the hegemonic, neoliberal ideals of the armed forces rather than provide concrete opportunities for the students it seeks to serve. In a similar vein, within these same schools, the military engages in recruitment for students who do not directly participate in programming but rather are targets for enlistment considering their tertiary educational trajectories.

Within recent years, pervasive use of the internet to engage the next generation of workers and learners has encouraged the US military to take note. Beyond the use of video games and simulations to determine the best course of action with actual military strategy, the US Army now has a 16-member esports team, which functions primarily as a recruitment tool despite the official website's insistence that the initiative has other goals:

> The United States Army eSports Team is a competition team of the U.S. Army. Its members are drawn from the Regular Army and Army Reserves…Soldiers have expressed a strong desire to represent the Army in competitive gaming. They have shown Army leaders how gaming can help us connect to young people and show them a side of Soldiers they may not expect. This initiative will help make our Soldiers more visible and relatable to today's youth. Members of the eSports outreach teams are not recruiters…They will be in a support role to help young people see Soldiers in a different light and understand the many different roles people can have in the Army. They will help the Army address the growing disconnect with society. Competitive online gaming will be part of the duties of the eSports team. (recruiting.army.mil)

Despite the messaging that polishes over any suspicion of foul play, the statement comes directly from the US Army recruitment website, and multiple reports from journalists and participants from esports events indicate that recruitment is the primary objective outside of brand control. The initiative itself is only a few years old, gaining most of its traction during the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (Woody, 2020). Enlistment has seen a decline in the last decade and esports programming seeks to address this and other issues as well as adapt to a younger generation of recruits. Technological literacy amongst millennials and younger generations pushed officials like former Assistant Secretary of the Army, Casey Wardynski, to add funding and support to the Army esports team. Although flashy displays are not a new technique to entice adolescents into a lifetime of service, the Mobile Exhibit Company's use of the Extreme Truck is one of its most effective lures to date. The Extreme Truck wheels the latest gaming consoles to high schools and college campuses across the country and allows followers to track their movements through associated social media accounts (Gold, 2014). The Extreme Truck and most of the expensive gaming hardware inside it rely on students being swayed by two axioms most educators and

policymakers have yet to find a suitable replacement for. The first principle is that the illusion provided by the video games provides ample opportunity to weave conversation of real commitments to a life of military service into those of sophomoric gamer jargon. Casual conversations around healthcare benefits whilst high school students determine who has first rights to the controller blurs the body count on the screen from the very real one held by the US armed forces and its affiliates. Keeping the armed forces out of public schools, particularly those with Title I designation, is not an option given the risk of losing Department of Defense funding (Tannock, 2005; Abajian, 2018). While traditional recruitment practices like career days and the Extreme Truck exhibit offer some sort of implicit trade-off benefit for public schools when they receive funding from the DOD, esports removes the need for educators and school mediators. To be more explicit, any discussion regarding career options and college preparation occurs separately from messaging that promotes military enlistment like it would in a school environment. Online in the privacy of a child's or adolescent's home, esports team members have unlimited access to speak to youth about the benefits they experience from their participation in the military.

As if the allure of a college education and home loan assistance were not enough through the use of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (GI Bill), the armed forces work to recruit brown and Black youth in their schools and neighbourhoods. Implicit in this recruitment is the desire to remain sovereign over these communities and by doing so, determine the ways in which these communities provide for their families and potentially die in the fight to return and fully realise their dreams. As Henry Giroux writes in his piece about militarisation and the biopolitics of popular culture, military recruiters utilise a variety of tactics to entice young people of colour.

It seems that the army has discovered hip-hop and urban culture and rather than listening to the searing indictment of poverty, joblessness, and despair that is one of their central messages, the army recruiters appeal to their most commodified elements by letting the 'potential recruits hang out in the Hummer, where they can peep the sound system or watch recruitment videos.' Of course, they will not view any videos of Hummers being blown up in the war-torn streets of Baghdad (Giroux, 2008; 2010).

Based on this description, it seems apparent that the desire to enlist some of our most vulnerable populations, have them maim, kill, and terrorise, and endure the same overseas converges with this same population's desire to access higher education, move beyond financial hardships, and essentially live the full lives promised to all Americans but typically only granted to their white counterparts. If we understand the desperation of or simply the hope of these communities, certainly hip-hop and recruitment videos in Hummers are sufficient enticements to obfuscate the real dangers that, as previously mentioned, are symptoms to 'overcome' and not an insidious and ever-changing issue like racism.

MOTEN & HARNEY

While drafting the GI Bill, US bureaucratic powers designed the legislation to prevent economic collapse and potential rioting upon the soldiers' return, not to provide educational and vocational opportunities to citizens in exchange for their service to the nation. The increase in economic wartime output following the Great Depression was enough to satisfy concerns regarding US stability, but not enough to provide long-term relief following the post-war transition after World War II. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in particular, described fears of, '"…an environment of inflation and unemployment, to a place on a bread line or on a corner selling apples,"' (Olson, 1973, p. 598). Working alongside the National Resources Planning Board and the Armed Forces Committee on Post-War Educational Opportunities for Service Personnel, the two committees developed reports that estimated eight or nine million unemployed workers following the post-war transition without meaningful legislation. As an added measure, senators from southern states fought to guarantee that federal funding for the GI Bill would be distributed by the states, ensuring a more discerning eye over how benefits were apportioned. To be certain, there were many other strategies that government agencies could have employed to curtail incoming economic and social issues following the end of World War II. In the 1930s before the war began, the US government focused on pouring money into corporations, creating jobs, and other means of fighting economic depression (Olson, 1973). Ultimately, the choice to stimulate the economy through the lives of veterans and their families stemmed from fear of their training, and the realisation that the war left a legion of untrained workers in America. Essentially, there was a debt to be paid and a fear that unsatisfied veterans would instigate violent revolution upon their return. There was historical precedence to justify politicians' worry; in the years following World War I and in the early years of the Depression, thousands of destitute veterans mobilised a march on Washington with a demand for immediate compensation. General Macarthur sent federal troops to quickly disband the group, but the embarrassment of the incident prompted legislators and special interest groups to prevent further incidents (Mettler, 2005). In subsequent years, namely during the Vietnam War, veterans and active duty soldiers alike took varying measures to speak out against the US war machine.

The anti-war movement of the '60s occurred after the two World Wars, both of which included increasing action against leftist ideology and outright political and economic war against communism in the US and abroad. Efforts to infiltrate educational resources on anti-communism in the 1950s were mostly unsuccessful for organisations like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In their efforts to fund a student group, the National Student Association, they planted the roots for radical student leadership that would later inform and inspire Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). A decade later, SDS would organise and lead much of the student opposition regarding anti-war movements, civil rights, and other issues around the popular subversive movements of the '60s and '70s (Harrison, 1993). Much of the anti-war movement is described as organised by 'white, college students' whereas

the civil rights movement of the same era was Black-led and supported by multira-
cial coalitions. Their respective strategies also differed with the anti-war movement
utilising sometimes uncommon or provoking strategies that lost organisers public
favour. Violence in the barracks or militant leaflets sent to fellow GIs confirmed
community and bureaucratic fears that the opportunity to join the middle class could
not upend protracted struggles and movements. In contrast, the strict focus on non-
violence and clear organisational messaging within the civil rights movement helped
garner support from multiple demographics to secure the gains typically lauded by
centrists. Despite the unconventional organising done by anti-war student organisers,
television news coverage of draft calls, civilian casualties, and the body count for
American troops helped foster a sense of indignation in civilians and GIs alike. By
1970, the majority of American people polled were in favour of the troops withdraw-
ing from Vietnam (Lunch & Sperlich, 1979). Efforts to recruit enlistees on college
campuses from companies like Dow Chemical – the same corporation responsible
for manufacturing napalm – were met with overwhelming protests. US troop levels
in Vietnam peaked in 1968 at 540,000, with hundreds of US soldiers reported dead
every week (Zunes & Laird, 2010). The term 'fragging' derives from the fragmenta-
tion, the shower of shrapnel that is released when a grenade or other explosive device
creates fragments upon its detonation and typically refers to soldiers maiming or
killing their superior officers. Historically, incidents of this level were uncommon
throughout military history in the brief life of the US as an imperialist power, demon-
strating both the cohesion of the US military power, as well as the effectiveness of
utilising social and economic benefits to appease troops. However, the burgeoning
Black consciousness of the late '60s, early '70s, drove many American citizens,
college students in particular, to resist conscription and compulsory participation in
wartime activities (for example, nationalist parades, televising or publicising con-
flicts, etc.). Resistance, outside of the literal fragging that took place within barracks
and the friendly fire on battlefields, took shape in the form of poetry, underground
magazines, and other methods to *frag* the tension as an instrument of the state.

   In particular, the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. prompted repression and
resistance amongst Black GIs stationed overseas in Vietnam. Wallace Terry's *Bloods*
(1984) utilises the oral histories of Black Vietnam veterans to highlight the stark dif-
ferences in experiences that led to their participation, military assignment during the
war, and reception upon their return. In the introduction, Terry notes that in his earlier
trips to Vietnam during initial covering of Black GIs, many of the soldiers felt a sense
of duty to lead in armed struggle within a desegregated Army –now considered one
of the most progressive and diverse institutions in the nation (Terry, 1984). All of the
veterans speak to the tension at home and within the barracks, some of them inspired
to draw strength amongst fellow Black veterans and resist. Much of this resistance
was encouraged by the Vietcong, who believed that stoking racial fears and desires of
revenge amongst Black veterans would find them allies. The oral history from Staff
Sergeant Don F. Browne affirms both:

> A few days after the assassination, some of the white guys got a little sick and tired of seeing Dr. King's picture on the TV screen…He said, 'I wish they'd take that nigger's picture off.' He was a fool to begin with, because there were three black guys sitting in the living room when he said it. And we commenced to give him a lesson in when to use that word and when you should not use that word. A physical lesson. With the world focused on the King assassination and the riots that following in the United States, the North Vietnamese, being politically astute, schooled the Viet Cong to go on a campaign of psychological warfare against the American forces…To play on the sympathy of the black soldier, the Viet Cong would shoot at a white guy, then let the black guy behind him go through, then shoot at the next white guy. It didn't take long for that kind of word to get out. And the reaction in some companies was to arrange your personnel where you had an all-black or nearly all-black unit to send out. (Terry, 1984, pp. 263–264)

The disciplined structure of the armed forces prescribes uniformity and camaraderie amongst its troops, if only for the promise that they receive the same glory for having saved their country from communist, foreign intrusion. Many students engaging in critical studies also see themselves as arbiters of knowledge in this way, saving the institution from itself through their participation if only to keep the dream alive for themselves and their kin. Moten and Harney remind us that even with critique, the dual role of student/customer requires an internalisation that ultimately the role of the student is to become a problem for the university:

> Students must come to see themselves as the problem, which, counter to the complaints of restorationist critics of the university, is precisely what it means to be a customer, to take on the burden of realization and always necessarily be inadequate to it. Later, these students will be able to see themselves properly as obstacles to society, or perhaps, with lifelong learning, students will return having successfully diagnosed themselves as the problem. (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 29)

The pressure cooker atmosphere of Vietnam trained many soldiers to learn that they, in fact, were the problem and simultaneously the solution to their own strife when they refused to bend to the will of antiblackness in the barracks. Similarly, the political broadcasts of Hanoi Hannah urged American GIs, Black soldiers in particular, to withdraw from Vietnam and would include news of anti-Black violence at home that the American broadcasts failed to include (North, 2018; Miller, 2020). Assuredly, the horrors of war are not like the conditions of academia, and yet one hand washes the other. The roles found in early plantation settlements have been resumed under new political language; the pipeline between institutions of higher education, the armed forces, and the welfare state makes this clear. The aspiring student comes to the university to learn courses on advanced techniques in policing, defence, and military strategy – night classes teach you strategies of conquest. Before patrolling neighbourhoods, George Zimmerman's career aspirations revolved around joining the Marines, following in the footsteps of his father, a careerist who served in Vietnam and the Pentagon. Zimmerman joined his local ROTC after-school programme at a nearby middle school but never actualised his dream to enlist and was en route to graduate from a programme in criminal justice when the murder of Trayvon Martin occurred. After a string of neighbourhood break-ins, Zimmerman was asked to lead

the block's neighbourhood watch programme as the captain and advised nearby residents to call him after they contacted local police (Francescani, 2012). Harney and Moten (2013) recall the reiterations of settler-colonial violence and the resulting antagonisms created between soldier and enemy, student and indentured customer, deputy and slave:

> Or rather, since nightriders and settlers never really went away, deputised for segregation, anti-communism, migration, and nuclear family heteropatriarchy in much of the Global North, what policy represents is a new weapon in the hands of these citizen-deputies. Stand your ground – because man was not born to run away, because his color won't run, because again and again the settler must incant the disavowal and target the epidermolise trace of his own desire for refuge – is only the most notorious iteration of this renewed dispersal and deputisation of state violence, aimed into the fugitive, ambling neighborhoods of the undercommons. (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 75)

There are no antagonisms between the armed state and the university, the classroom functions to train the incoming class of deputies. As such, to frag is to join in a state of fugitivity and fundamentally reject deputisation. The growing number of programmes and accreditations focused on surveillance, policing, and reforming any fragmentations left by fugitives is no surprise when considering that almost one in five police officers is a veteran despite veterans and active duty soldiers constituting an aggregate six percent of the population (Weichselbaum & Schwartzapfel, 2017). The most popular careers for veterans following policing are truck driving and management yet those professions do not provide the same degree of benefits and structure to employers and employees for increasing the number of soldiers come police officers.

> But then nobody writes about the state any more, because governance is too clever for that, governance invites us to laugh at the state, to look back at it, its political immaturity in the face of governmentality by all, its dangerous behavior, its laziness, its blackness. Which means really the exhaustion of blackness thought by the state and the new way to steal from the stolen, who refuse to give up the secret of thieving with their theft, the secret of their thieving of their theft. (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 53)

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